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1 Introduction
In the modern economy, the overwhelming majority of large enterprises has two features: they are
multiproduct firms (MPFs) (e.g. Bailey and Friedlaender, 1982) and they have vertical business rela-
tions.1 Needless to say, automobile manufactures produce several varieties of automobile, mini car,
passenger car, sports car, and so on. Moreover, almost all of them also sell several varieties of passen-
ger car. To do so, automobile manufacturers purchase steel, tires, and a number of parts produced by
their suppliers. Buyer-supplier relationships are crucial for firm’s performance especially in automo-
bile industry. Previous researches in management have found a positive relationship between coopera-
tive inter-firm relations and the performance of manufactures and suppliers (Cusumano and Takeishi,
1991; Helper and Sako, 1994; Dyer, 1996).2 This implies that vertical relationships significantly
aect many strategic decisions of downstream firms, which determine these firms’ performances.3
As well as vertical relationships, horizontal relationships such as competitor collaboration among
automobile manufacturers are widely observed and also would have a great influence on the firms’
performances. Cooperative relationships among manufactures take various forms such as partial eq-
uity ownership, joint research/production, OEM, license, etc.4 Such competitor collaboration is still
controversial. Economists and policymakers dealing with antitrust and regulatory issues have rec-
ognized that conventional wisdom on single-product firms does not always apply to MPFs.5 We
therefore investigate how competition between MPFs in vertical relationships aects horizontal rela-
tionships such as competitor collaborations or firms’ performances.
1Bernard et al. (2010) show good evidence for the importance of MPFs. Investigating firms in the U.S., they show
that MPFs are present in all industries and produce 87% of total output. They think of firms producing a single-product as
those whose range of products falls within a single five-digit SIC category. Multiproduct firms, on the other hand, are those
whose product range is wide enough to span several five-digit SIC categories. In fact, some firms would produce several
varieties of product which are classified into the same category. In a sense, almost all firms must be MPFs.
2Some studies show that cooperative relationships in Japan outperform their U.S. counterparts (Nishiguchi, 1994; Dyer,
1996) and the buyer-supplier relationship in Japan has several distinctive features (Morita, 2001). First, a large manufacture
typically owns partial shareholding of their suppliers. Second, suppliers make investments that are customized to their
purchaser. Third, the relationship is long-term and stable.
3It is well-known in economics literature that vertical structure has a great influence on behaviors of firms (e.g., DeGraba,
1990; Mukherjee and Pennings, 2011).
4For example, partial ownership between Renault and Nissan, joint research between GM and Honda, Toyota and Ford,
joint production between GM and Toyota, Mitsubishi and Nissan, OEM among Nissan, Mazda, Suzuki and Mitsubishi.
5Theoretical studies point out the importance of studies on MPFs for a long time (e.g. Bailey and Friedlaender, 1982;
Brander and Eaton, 1984). For a decade, a number of studies have been made not only in industrial organization (e.g.,
Johnson and Myatt, 2003, 2006) but also in other fields of economics such as international trade (e.g., Eckel and Neary,
2010; Bernard et al., 2011).
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We consider several types of vertically related industry where duopolists produce two varieties
of final product. The product that can be produced at a lower cost is called core product, and the
other is called non-core product. Downstream firms require common input (or labor) in order to
produce both of products. They have dierent technologies for one of the products with respect to
eciency. The present setup yields several new results. First, when an upstream market consists of
exclusive suppliers, an ecient firm may have incentive for technology transfer, which improves an
inecient firm’s technology for producing the non-core product, without any payment. Second, such
technology transfer enhances both consumer surplus and social welfare. Finally, an inecient firm
may earn more than an ecient firm under some types of upstream structures.6
The eect of the technology transfer on profits of downstream MPFs can be decomposed into the
two eects: the production shift eect and input price eect. The first eect makes MPFs modify their
output portfolios of the two products.7 A reduction in a firm’s marginal cost of a product increases the
output of the product, but decreases its competitor’s output of the same product. This is the standard
business-stealing eect. Furthermore it also makes the firm decrease its output of the substitute prod-
uct to avoid cannibalization. This allows its competitor to expand the other product. To summarize,
when a firm improves eciency of a product, the business-stealing eect directly hurts its competitor
whereas the latter eect benefits it. Thus the technology transfer has direct and indirect eects on
profits of downstream firms, with both eects working in the opposite directions.
The input price eect works through the upstream market. The technology transfer also aects
the pricing of upstream firms. A firm-specific supplier utilizes its input price for extracting rents from
its trading downstream firm. The technology transfer reduces the total output and input demand of the
ecient firm, while it increases those of the inecient firm. It thus decreases the input price of the
ecient firm and increases that of the inecient one. The technology transfer benefits the ecient
firm through the lower input price. From the view point of the inecient firm, the technology transfer
reduces ex post marginal cost of the product but increases that of the other product due to the increase
of the input price. Consequently, it accelerates the production shift between the two products.
One may wonder why we consider whether firms transfer its knowledge or technical know-how
6Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015) consider a Cournot duopoly with strategic delegation, where quantities of firms are
chosen by their managers and shows a similar result.
7Lin and Zhou (2013) point out this eect.
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without any payment. Generally, explicit knowledge can be transferred through licensing and con-
tracting since it is verifiable. Contrary to such transfer, codification of tacit knowledge is dicult and
such knowledge is unverifiable. Hence, licenses and contracts play, at best, the limited role in the
transfer of tacit knowledge (Mowery, 1983, p354).8 Moreover, this allows us to isolate the strategic
eects of technology transfer from other incentives by licensing payments.
In some industries, technology transfer without direct compensation indeed occurs through strate-
gic alliances or joint production ventures.9 Morita et al. (2010) investigate into collaborations among
firms. They take a survey, and observe 88 cases in which a firm transfers its technology without di-
rect compensation. Especially, 59% of the technology transfers are performed between firms without
partial equity ownerships. In the automobile industry, we can find some cases: the joint production
ventures between Nissan and Mitsubishi (NMKV), GM and Toyota (NUMMI) and the strategic al-
liance between Ford and Mazda.10 We here give the particulars of the first case. In 2013, Nissan and
Mitsubishi began the joint production of mini cars at the NMKV in Japan. Nissan had not produced
mini car in person before, and therefore Nissan purchased it from Mitsubishi, Suzuki and Mazda
by OEM. Since Mitsubishi has superior technology for mini car, the joint production would involve
technology transfers.
Our results suggest some implications for both policymakers and managers. The result on the
technology transfer tells us the eect of competitor collaborations on social welfare. Firms often use
complex collaborations to achieve a goal (e.g., profit maximization). Antitrust agencies had viewed
competitor collaborations as only collusive behaviors. However, in 1993, the National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984 was amended to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of
1993 (NCRPA) so that firms can engage in joint production. Furthermore, the Antitrust Guidelines
for Collaborations Among Competitors in 2000 proclaims that “the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) regard such collaborations as often being not only benign
8A joint venture is viewed as a mechanism to transfer knowledge that cannot be done by licensing (Kogut, 1988). For
further details of contractual diculties in transferring tacit knowledge, see also Ghosh and Morita (2012).
9Employees frequently give technical information to colleagues in other firms, including direct competitors (Schrader,
1991). In the literature on international economics, technology spillovers through FDI have been explored extensively. See
Lin and Saggi (1999) and Ishikawa and Horiuchi (2012).
10Creane and Konishi (2009) argue that the joint production between GM and Toyota involves technology transfers. They
provide the large cases of joint production. Ghosh and Morita (2012) also provide the rich cases for knowledge transfers.
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but procompetitive.”11 In the last three decades, the federal antitrust agencies indeed have come to
admit competitor collaborations. However, the welfare eect of such collaboration is still controver-
sial. Several recent studies obtain dierent implications on joint production with technology transfer
or know-how disclosure. For instance, joint production as a device to predate non-recipient firms
harms consumer surplus but enhances social welfare (Creane and Konishi, 2009).12 It is true that
economists usually define social welfare as the object function of the social planner, but policy mak-
ers often regard consumer surplus as a proper measure. In contrast to previous studies, as the joint
production certainly raises not only consumer surplus but also social welfare in our paper, our result
would promote such joint production.
Patent protection is one of the most important problems for managers. Our first result may imply,
however, that some technology spillovers are welcome.13 In other words, mangers do not have to
strive to protect their technological information for non-core products. Furthermore, the result on the
profit of MPFs also provides some implications for managers. In the real economy, MPFs face the
constraint on selecting the distribution of the management resource, such as R&D, advertisement and
human resources. Our result implies that there exist some situations when firms should not invest
their resource in less profitable segment.
Several recent studies have raised instances where technology transfer or know-how disclosure
without direct compensation can increase profit of technologically superior firm. Creane and Kon-
ishi (2009) consider an asymmetric oligopoly model with entry or exit, and show technology transfer
without any compensation can be profitable when it works as a type of predation or deterrence. Mat-
sushima and Ogawa (2012) examine incentive of knowledge disclosure for MPFs. They provide the
view of know-how disclosure which induces some firms to change their plans for location or spe-
cialized products. In those papers, technology transfer drives some rivals out of market or aects
decisions for entrants. The primary dierence with our model is that we restrict a situation where
neither entry nor exit occurs. Milliou and Petrakis (2012) show that a vertically integrated firm can
11Potential eciencies from the collaborations may be attained through a variety of contractual arrangements, including
joint ventures, trade or professional associations, licensing arrangements, or strategic alliances, etc.
12The eect of know-how disclosure on consumer surplus is positive while that on social welfare is ambiguous (Mat-
sushima and Ogawa, 2012).
13Suzuki (1993) analyzes the eects of technological diusion among and within vertical keiretsu groups in the Japanese
electrical machinery industry, and find that positive R&D spillovers, which stem from the R&D activities of other keiretsu
groups. It is remarkable that there are the spillovers between core firms of competing keiretsu groups.
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choose to fully disclose its knowledge to its downstream rival. In their paper, the technology transfer
intensifies downstream competition but expands downstream market size, which increases the whole-
sale revenue of the vertically integrated firm. Ghosh and Morita (2012) examine technology transfer
among competitors with a partial equity ownership, and show an equity alliance may induce the tech-
nology transfer. In contrast, our model does not include any direct elements such as PEO or wholesale
revenue, which increase the profit of technologically advanced firm. Matsushima and Zhao (2015)
examine a bilateral duopoly market in which each downstream firm has outside options and upstream
firms can engage in cost reduction and generate technological spillover. They find that each upstream
firm has incentive to voluntarily generate the spillover to its upstream rival. As well as our paper,
they also point out the importance of linkage between vertical relationship and technology transfer.
However, the mechanism of their paper is clearly dierent from ours since it stems from the existence
of outside options.
Our study is also in line with the vast literature on technology licensing. However, few studies
examine the impacts of technology licensing on MPFs. Except for analyzing single-product firms,
one of the related works is Mukherjee and Pennings (2011), who examine the eects of the union-
ization structure (viz., decentralized and centralized unions) on incentive for licensing. They show
the incentive for licensing is stronger under decentralized unions than centralized. A similar input
price eect of licensing in their paper also works in our setting. A notable dierence is that in our
model technology transfer without payment can indeed occur, while such license never occurs in their
model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our model and obtains a prelimi-
nary result on a property of multiproduct firms. Section 3 analyzes incentive for technology transfer
under vertical relationship. Section 4 analyzes alternative scenarios in upstream market. Section 5
oers some concluding remarks. All proofs of the results and derivations of the equilibrium outcomes
in the extension models are provided in the Appendices.
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2 Model and downstream competition: Preliminary result
2.1 Model
We first characterize downstream market, and then introduce the timing of the game. We follow the
model of Lin and Zhou (2013) without R&D investment.14 The downstream market is composed of
two multiproduct firms, named D1 and D2, which produce two types of final product, goods A and
B. The inverse demand functions are specified as
pk = v   (q1k + q2k)   (q1l + q2l) k; l 2 fA; Bg; k , l; (1)
where pk is the price of good k, qik shows the quantity of good k by downstream firm i 2 f1; 2g, and
v is a positive demand parameter. The parameter  2 [0; 1) reflects the substitution between goods A
and B.
Downstream firms require one unit of common input, e.g., raw material, which is commonly
used for goods A and B, to produce one unit of final goods. Each firm has dierent transformation
technologies for each good. Therefore the per unit production cost of good k of downstream firm i,
cik, is denoted by
cik = wi + zik; (2)
where wi is the input price for Di, which is determined in an upstream market. zik is the eciency
measure of a downstream firm and shows the technological level for good k of Di.15 We can also
interpret the production technology of the downstream firms as requiring two inputs, one is produced
in the upstream market and the other is supplied by a competitive sector. They have an uneven
technological level of input from the competitive sector. One product that the firms can produce at a
lower cost is called core product and the other one is called non-core product. We assume that good
A is the core product, and technological gap between firms is present only in the technology for the
non-core product.16 We refer to D1 (D2) as the ecient (inecient) firm. To summarize, we assume
z2B  z1B > ziA and ziA is normalized to zero for simplicity.
14Lin and Zhou (2013) investigate the R&D portfolio choices of multiproduct firms without vertical relationships.
15We obtain qualitatively similar results under the assumption that cik = zikwi, where zik > 0, which is employed in
Mukherjee and Pennings (2011).
16All of the results we present are equally true in the case where D1 is ecient in both technologies. Moreover, we
can also show that a quality advantage, which is reflected by demand parameters, rather than a cost advantage, will lead to
essentially the same result. See the discussion in Lin and Zhou (2013, p.88).
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The timing of the game is as follows. The model has two stages: in the first stage, input prices
are determined in the upstream market. We specify how the input prices are determined in Section 3.
In the second stage, observing the input prices, the downstream firms engage in Cournot competition.
In what follows, we are looking for subgame perfect equilibria. Note that the decision of technology
transfer is not included in the game. We analyze whether the firms have incentives for technology
transfer by comparative statics.
2.2 Downstream competition
In this subsection, we examine an important property of MPFs. In the second stage, given the input
price(s), each downstream firm chooses its quantity pair (qiA; qiB) in the final good market. Each
firm’s problem in this stage can be written as
max
(qiA;qiB)
Di = (pA   ciA)qiA + (pB   ciB)qiB: (3)
The first-order conditions for profit maximization of Di are as follows.
@Di
@qik
= (pk   cik)   qik  qil|{z}
negative eects
= 0: (4)
The last term captures cannibalization eects, which are present only for MPFs. That is, an increase
in quantity of one good reduces not only the price of the good but also that of the other one, so that it
discourages itself from producing the other one.
It is evident that a decrease in a firm’s marginal cost of a product increases its output of that
product, but decreases its competitor’s output of the same product. The standard business-stealing
eect also works as well as for single-product firms. What is unique about MPFs is that the firm also
reduces its output of the substitute product to mitigate within-firm cannibalization, which allows its
competitor to expand the substitute product. Note that the above property is deeply related to our
results.
Assuming interior solutions exist, the equilibrium quantities are obtained as
qik =
(1   )v   2cik + c jk + 2cil   c jl
3(1   2) : (5)
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From (5), we certainly confirm the property mentioned above. This leads to the equilibrium profit of
each downstream firm,
Di =
(v   2ciA + c jA)2   2(v   2ciA + c jA)(v   2ciB + c jB) + (v   2ciB + c jB)2
9(1   2) :
3 How does upstream structure aect technology transfer?
In this section, we examine how upstream structure aects technology transfer in a vertically related
industry. The structure of the upstream market is the important element in this paper. We consider
five types of vertical structure: the upstream market consists of (I) competitive suppliers, (II) two up-
stream firms, named U1 and U2, which exclusively supply its input for D1 and D2 respectively, (III)
a monopolist employing uniform pricing, (IV) upstream market consists of a monopolist employing
discriminatory pricing, and (V) exclusive suppliers for D1 and D2, respectively, and common sup-
pliers, which supply its input for both D1 and D2. For simplicity, upstream firm(s) produces at no
costs. We consider the relationship between input supplier(s) and final goods producers, although this
model is suitable for much more general application. For example, the model can be applied to the
relationship between labor unions and firms.
Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the model (the last case is introduced in Section 4). We first
analyze the case (I).
[Figure 1 about here]
3.1 Competitive suppliers: Benchmark
Consider a competitive upstream market where the input price is zero. We can interpret this case as
a multiproduct duopoly model without vertical structure. We then introduce vertical structures and
show our main results in the next subsection.
In the benchmark case, the equilibrium quantity of each firm and price are solved as (substitute
ziA = 0 when k = A)
qCik =
(1   )v   2zik + z jk + 2zil   z jl
3(1   2) ; (6)
and
pCk =
1
3(v + zik + z jk): (7)
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We then obtain the equilibrium profit of each firm:
CDi =
v2   2v(v   2ziB + z jB) + (v   2ziB + z jB)2
9(1   2) : (8)
The conditions that the interior solutions indeed exist are
qCik > 0 ,  <
v   2zik + z jk
v   2zil + z jl  ¯
C
ik: (9)
Hereafter, we restrict our attention to the case where both downstream firms provide both products.
We examine the incentive for the ecient firm to transfer its technology. The technology transfer
improves the D2’s eciency for the non-core product, but does not aect the technology for the
core product. In words, the technology is valuable for the non-core product but can not be applied
to the core one.17 Consider a situation that the technology transfer yields no direct compensation
for D1. Therefore the firms agree to the technology transfer if a technology improvement for the
non-core product of D2 increases not only the profit of D2 but also that of D1. From (8), we obtain
dD1=dz2B > 0, which implies,
Proposition 1 When the upstream market is competitive, the ecient firm has no incentive for the
technology transfer to the inecient firm.
The technology transfer has two eects, which work oppositely. A decrease in the D2’s marginal cost
of good B discourages D1 from producing good B. On the other hand, it causes that D2 produces
good A less whereas good B more. Since D2 shifts its production from goods A to B, D1 can produce
good A aggressively. In this case, the former eect dominates the latter, and hence the technology
transfer is not profitable for D1.
We are also interested in the relationship between the profits of the downstream firms. Comparing
them, we have
Proposition 2 When the upstream market is competitive, the ecient firm always earns more profit
than the inecient firm.
17This is an important assumption for the technology transfer. However, we would obtain qualitatively similar results if
the technology is available for the core product but the availability is suciently low.
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From (6), D2 produces good A more than D1 and good B less. D2 benefits from the higher marginal
cost of good B, because it works as a commitment device to produce the core product aggressively.
However this force is not strong enough to compensate for the disadvantage in eciency.
3.2 Exclusive suppliers
In this subsection, we examine the case where the upstream market is composed of two firms which
supply its input to the downstream firm exclusively.18
Each upstream firm simultaneously decides its input price so as to maximize its own profit.19
Each upstream firm’s problem can be written as
max
wi
Ui = wiQi(w1;w2);
where Qi  qiA + qiB.20 The first-order condition for the upstream firm i is
@Ui
@wi
= wi
 4
3(1 + ) + Qi(w1;w2) = 0: (10)
The reaction function of upstream firm i is
wi =
1
8(2v   2ziB + z jB + 2w j): (11)
Equation (11) implies that the input prices are strategic complements. The equilibrium input prices
are obtained as
wEi =
1
30(10v   7ziB + 2z jB): (12)
We get that dwEi =dziB < 0, and dw
E
j =dziB > 0. This implies
Lemma 1 When the upstream market consists of exclusive suppliers, as the eciency of downstream
firm i increases, the input price of upstream firm i ( j) increases (decreases).
18According to Nobeoka (1996), Nissan bought fuel filters from Tsuchiya Seisakusho, while Mitsubishi bought it from
Nippon Denso and Tokyoroki. With respect to fuel filters, Tsuchiya Seisakusho was the exclusive supplier for Nissan and
Nippon Denso and Tokyoroki were those for Mitsubishi. In 2014, Nissan buys some engine cooling and air-conditioning
system products from MAHLE berh Japan while Mitsubishi does not, which is another example for the exclusive supplier.
19This setting means the contract is take-it-or-leave-it oer. Some readers would think that the bargaining power of
suppliers is relatively weak in reality. However, Ahmadjian and Oxley (2013) indicate that the profitabilities of Japanese
auto suppliers are not lower than those of Japanese auto assemblers in terms of ROA (Table 2 in their paper), which implies
that auto suppliers are not always relatively weak to their trading assemblers.
20We assume that the upstream firms determine their input prices such that the downstream firms can produce both of
the final goods. Since the downstream firms are MPFs, their input demand functions are kinked. Therefore, we must check
not only the local optimality (i.e., first-order condition) but also the global optimality (i.e., deviations “beyond” the kinked
point). The calculations are described in the appendix.
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An eciency improvement of Di’s non-core product raises the profitability of the firm. This leads to
a higher input price by its exclusive supplier. On the other hand, D j decreases its total quantity. The
downward shift of input demand decreases the input price.
The equilibrium quantity and price are obtained as
qEik =
20(1   )v   4(11 + 4)zik + (19 + 11)z jk + 4(4 + 11)zil   (11 + 19)z jl
90(1   2) ; (13)
pEk =
1
18(10v + 5z1k + 5z2k   z1l   z2l): (14)
This leads to the equilibrium profits of the firms:
EDi =
(20v + 16ziB   11z jB)2   2(20v + 16ziB   11z jB)(20v   44ziB + 19z jB) + (20v   44ziB + 19z jB)2
9  302(1   2) (15)
and
EUi =
(10v   7ziB + 2z jB)2
15  45(1 + ) : (16)
The conditions for the interior solutions, qEik > 0, are
 <
20v   44zik + 19z jk + 16zil   11z jl
20v + 16zik   11z jk   44zil + 19z jl  ¯
E
ik: (17)
We also have to check whether the upstream firms have no incentive to deviate from the their input
prices. Let ¯Ed be the upperbound of , and we can show that the condition  < ¯
E
d assures the
upstream firms do not deviate.21 Hence, the condition for the equilibrium is  < minf¯Eik; ¯Ed g.
We now turn to the central issue of this section, namely the incentive for the technology transfer
in the vertical relationship.
Proposition 3 When the upstream market consists of exclusive suppliers, the ecient firm may have
the incentive for the technology transfer to the inecient firm and the inecient firm may accept the
oer. Formally for v > vˆE , EDi is decreasing in z2B if and only if  2 (E1; ¯E2) where E1 and ¯E2 are
the threshold values of  such that dEDi=dz2B = 0 respectively.22
21We derive the threshold values ¯d for each upstream structure in Appendix B.
22It might be possible to define the condition for the technology transfer as when there exists z02B 2 [z1B; z2B) such that
Di(v; z1B; z02B; ) > Di(v; z1B; z2B; ) for i = 1; 2. Our definition is sucient for the other. Moreover, that is suitable when
the cost reductions of the technology transfer are uncertain in advance.
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The technology transfer has the two notable eects. An eciency improvement for good B of D2
increases (decreases) the quantity of good B (A) from D2, whereas decreases (increases) that of good
B (A) from D1 - what we call the “production shift eect.” In addition, the technological improvement
also induces a lower (higher) input price for D1 (D2) - what we call the “input price eect.” Therefore,
D1 can produce the core product aggressively, and purchase cheaper inputs from its exclusive supplier.
In turn, although D2 can not produce good A aggressively, and besides must purchase more expensive
inputs, it can produce good B more owing to the lower ex post marginal cost of good B. When the
condition in Proposition 3 is satisfied, the benefit can be large enough to compensate for the loss
for both firms, and consequently the technology transfer can indeed occur. The firms can utilize the
technology transfer as a credible device for the “output specialization.”
Figure 2 illustrates an example for the proposition above. When z2B is suciently low, a decrease
in z2B increases both firms’ profits. The detail of the conditions is shown in Figure 3. For the tech-
nology transfer,  plays an important role for the condition. That is,  deeply aects the degree of
the production shift eect. Equation (13) shows how the technology transfer modifies their produc-
tion portfolios. Clearly, the dierence between z1B and z2B is also important. When the dierence
between z1B and z2B is relatively large, the D1’s quantity of good A is small while that of good B is
large. Suppose that the technology transfer decreases z2B, it yields an decrease in the price of good B
and the D1’s quantity of good B, resulting in the large loss for D1.23
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
When competing firms intend to perform cooperative behaviors such as technology transfer, an-
titrust authority must beware that it does not have anti-competitive eects.
Proposition 4 If the technology transfer benefits both downstream firms, then it always enhances
both consumer surplus and social welfare.
How does eciency of firms aect consumer surplus or social welfare? It is well know that making
an inecient firm more ecient can reduce welfare (Lahiri and Ono, 1988). The intuition of their
23Marjit (1990) also shows that technology licensing with fixed fees is likely to occur between firms which are reasonably
close in terms of their initial technologies.
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result is as follows. A cost reduction in a relatively less ecient firm results in an increase in the total
output, which clearly enhances consumer surplus. The cost reduction, however, shifts production
from the more ecient firms to the less ecient one, so that producer surplus may fall. Although the
latter negative eect also exists in our model, the technology transfer benefits both downstream firms.
Hence, the eect to producer surplus is also positive. The technology transfer indeed occurs only if it
enhances both consumer surplus and social welfare.
We turn to another interest: which firm can outperform? Comparing the profits of the downstream
firms, we get the following:
Proposition 5 When the upstream market consists of exclusive suppliers, the inecient firm may earn
more profit than that of the ecient firm. Formally for v > vE , ED2 > ED1 if and only if  2 (E ; ¯Ed )
where E is the threshold value of  such that ED2 = ED1.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. There exist two positive eects of the ineciency on the
technology for good B in this case. First, by Lemma 1, thanks to its ineciency, the inecient firm
can purchase its input cheaper than the ecient rival. Since the input is used for both good A and B
commonly, the non-core segment of D2 serves to indirectly subsidize its core segment.24 In addition,
the inecient technology for the non-core product works as a commitment device to expand the core
one. For the reason above, this counterintuitive result may occur in our model.
Figures 2 and 4 illustrate examples for the proposition. Note that when z2B or  are suciently
high, the profit of the inecient firm exceeds that of the ecient firm. The detail of the conditions
is shown in Figure 5. The figure shows that when  is large, in other words, when the production
shift eect works strongly, the inecient firm outperforms the ecient rival. The dierence between
z1B and z2B is also important. When  is relatively small (e.g.,  = 0:6), the condition requires
the dierence between z1B and z2B is relatively large. This means when the production shift eect is
weak, D2 needs less inecient technology to outperform its rival because both the commitment eect
to expand the core product and the input price eect must work strongly.
[Figures 4 and 5 about here]
24This eect is also emphasized in the accounting literature. Due to the latent cross-subsidization eect, firms which sell
multiple markets can understate the value added by less profitability market (Arya and Mittendorf, 2011).
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4 Extensions of the model
So far, we have shown that the technology transfer may occur under the upstream market with the
exclusive suppliers. As shown in this section, the technology transfer does not occur when an up-
stream market is composed of a monopolist, but occurs when many suppliers, which are introduced
in Section 4. The result on the profit is also obtained under an upstream market with discriminatory
monopolist and many suppliers. Table 1 summarizes the results of this paper.
Table 1. Summary of the Results
Upstream structures Competitive Exclusive Uniform Pricing Discriminatory Many
Suppliers Suppliers Monopolist Monopolist Suppliers
Technology transfer     
Inecient firm outperforms     
Consider now the upstream market consists of a monopolist. The following two subsections in-
vestigate two kinds of upstream market, that with the monopolist employing uniform pricing and that
with the monopolist employing discriminatory pricing. The timing structure of the game is the same
in the previous section. Main purpose in the following two subsections is to show the technology
transfer does not occur in the markets with upstream monopolists. Subsection 4.3 examines an ex-
tended model, named “many suppliers”, which is composed of both exclusive and common suppliers.
4.1 Monopolist employing uniform pricing
In this subsection, we consider the case where the upstream monopolist, M, sets a same input price
to both downstream firms. The outcome in the second stage is the same as that in the last section. In
the first stage the upstream monopolist faces the problem:
max
w
M = w
X
i2f1;2g
X
k2fA;Bg
qik: (18)
The equilibrium input price is obtained as
wMU =
1
8(4v   z1B   z2B): (19)
We thus get the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 When the upstream monopolist employs uniform pricing, as the eciency in good B in-
creases, the input price increases.
An eciency improvement in a good increases the quantity of the good and decreases that of the
other. Since the increase in quantity of the good exceeds the decrease in quantity of the others, the
total input demand shifts upward so that the input price goes up.
We obtain the equilibrium profits of the firms:
MUDi =
(4v + ziB + z jB)2   2(4v + ziB + z jB)(4v   15ziB + 9z jB) + (4v   15ziB + 9z jB)2
9  82(1   2) ; (20)
MUM =
(4v   z1B   z2B)2
48(1 + ) ; (21)
where the condition for the equilibrium is  < minf¯MUik ; ¯MUd g.
We are interested in the incentive for the technology transfer and conclude that it never occurs in
this case.
Proposition 6 When the upstream monopolist employs uniform pricing, the ecient firm has no in-
centive for the technology transfer to the inecient firm.
The intuition behind this proposition is similar to that in Proposition 1. There is an additional negative
eect for the ecient firm through input price. As Lemma 2 shows, the technology transfer yields
a higher input price for both downstream firms. This interferes with an expansion in good A of the
ecient firm directly. The negative eect therefore dominates the positive eect from an expansion
in the core product.
We turn to the next question: which firm will get a higher profit. Comparing the profits of the
downstream firms, we get
Proposition 7 When the upstream monopolist employs uniform pricing, the ecient firm always
earns a higher profit than that of the inecient firm.
Proposition 7 is parallel to Proposition 2. Under uniform pricing, the dierence in eciency aects
only competition in the final good market. Hence, the intuition in Proposition 2 can be also applied
to this case.
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4.2 Monopolist employing discriminatory pricing
We next analyze the case where the upstream market consists of the monopolist employing discrimi-
natory pricing.
In the first stage the upstream monopolist faces the problem:
max
(w1;w2)
M = w1Q1(w1;w2) + w2Q2(w1;w2); (22)
where Qi  Pk2fA;Bg qik. The equilibrium input prices are
wMDi =
1
4
(2v   ziB): (23)
Lemma 3 When the upstream monopolist employs discriminatory pricing, an eciency improvement
of a downstream firm increases its input price but has no eect on the input price of the other down-
stream firm.
An eciency improvement of Di shifts the input demand of Di (D j) upward (downward). There-
fore the input price for Di (D j) increases (decreases). However, since the pricing for downstream
firms is complement, there is another eect which works oppositely toward the input demand eects
above. For the input price of D j, two eects are canceled out, and consequently the Di’s eciency
improvement has no impact on the D j’s input price.
We obtain the equilibrium profits of the firms:
MDDi =
(2v + 2ziB   z jB)2   2(2v + 2ziB   z jB)(2v   6ziB + 3z jB) + (2v   6ziB + 3z jB)2
9  42(1   2) ; (24)
and
MDM =
(2v   z1B)2 + (2v   z2B)2 + (z2B   z1B)2
24(1 + ) ; (25)
where the condition for the equilibrium is  < minf¯MDik ; ¯MDd g.
We first compare the input prices under uniform pricing and under discriminatory pricing.
Lemma 4 When the upstream monopolist employs discriminatory pricing, it sets a higher (lower)
input price to the (in)ecient firm than when it employs uniform pricing. That is wMD1 > wMU > wMD2 .
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Since the ex ante profitability of the ecient firm is higher than that of the less ecient one, the
monopolist sets a higher input price for the ecient firm in order to exploit it when using price
discrimination.
We check whether the ecient firm has incentive for the technology transfer or not.
Proposition 8 When the upstream monopolist employs discriminatory pricing, the ecient firm has
no incentive for the technology transfer to the inecient firm.
In this case, the technology transfer also raises the input price for the inecient firm. However it
does not decrease input price for the ecient firm. The positive eects can not be large enough to
compensate for the loss from giving up the dominance in ex ante eciency.
We next examine which firm can outperform its rival. Comparing the profits of the downstream
firms, we then have
Proposition 9 When the upstream monopolist employs discriminatory pricing, the inecient firm
may earn a higher profit than that of the ecient firm. Formally for v > vMD, MDD2 > MDD1 if and only
if  2 (MD; ¯MDd ) where MD is the threshold value of  such that MDD2 = MDD1 .
We can also apply the intuition behind Proposition 5. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the numerical exam-
ples of Proposition 9 and the detail of the conditions is shown in Figure 8. Figure 6 also shows that
the more inecient the inecient firm becomes, the more profit both firms get. This observation is
similar to Lemma 1 in Arya and Mittendorf (2010), which shows a multi-market firm may lose by an
increase in a market size.
[Figures 6 and 7 and 8 about here]
4.3 Many suppliers
We complete this section by discussing what happens if the model is extended to an upstream market
with many suppliers. Consider an industry where both D1 and D2 trade with nE exclusive suppliers
respectively, and nC firms supply to both D1 and D2. Hereafter, we call the latter “common suppliers.”
Figure 9 summarizes the structure of the extended model. Note that when nE = 1 and nC = 0, this
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model is reduced to the model in the subsection 3.2 and when nE = 0 and nC = 1, it is also reduced
to the model with the uniform pricing monopolist.
[Figure 9 about here]
The technologies of the downstream firms are modified as follows. The downstream firms require
one unit of nC + nE kinds of input, which is commonly used for goods A and B, to produce one unit
of final goods. Therefore the per unit production cost of good k of downstream firm i, cik, is denoted
by
cik =
nCX
s=1
wcs +
nEX
h=1
wih + zik s 2 f1; :::; nCg; h 2 f1; :::; nEg; (26)
where wcs is the input price of common supplier s, wih is that of downstream firm i’s exclusive supplier
h and zik is an eciency measure.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the common suppliers and the exclusive
suppliers simultaneously decide their input prices. In the second stage, observing the input prices, the
downstream firms engage in Cournot competition.
The profits of the common supplier s and the exclusive supplier ih are respectively
Ucs = wcs(Q1 + Q2); Uih = wihQi: (27)
In the first stage, each upstream firm maximizes its own profit above. After some calculations, the
equilibrium input prices are obtained as
wcs =
4v   z1B   z2B
2(2nC + nE + 2) ; (28)
and
wih =
2(3nE + 2)v   (3nC + 3nE + 4)ziB + (3nC + 2)z jB
2(3nE + 2)(2nC + nE + 2) : (29)
Substituting the input prices into the outcome in the second stage, we can obtain the equilibrium prof-
its of the downstream firms. Figures 10 and 11 provide some numerical examples of the relationship
between the profits of the downstream firms and z2B. As the figures indicate, when z2B is suciently
low, the technology transfer benefits both firms. When z2B is suciently high, the profit of the inef-
ficient firm exceeds that of the ecient one. We conclude that the results in the exclusive suppliers
case also hold in the industry with more complex vertical relationship.
[Figures 10 and 11 about here]
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper explores the impact of competition between multiproduct firms in vertical relationships
on horizontal relationships: technology transfers between competitors and a dierence in firms’ per-
formances. To this end, we develop a multiproduct Cournot model with a vertical structure and
examine incentive for the technology transfer without any payment. We find that when the upstream
market consists of exclusive suppliers or many suppliers, the technology transfer may benefit both
downstream firms. Such technology transfer enhances both consumer surplus and social welfare. In
addition, an inecient downstream firm may outperform its ecient rival.
Since cost structures of MPFs influence their output portfolios, an MPF with advanced technology
will have incentive to utilize the technology transfer so as to modify the output portfolio in its favor.
For the recipient MPF, although such technology transfer shifts its output from more profitable good
to less profitable one, the profit may indeed increase. This is because the positive eect from the e-
ciency improvement of the recipient product can dominate the negative eects from the modification
on the output portfolio and the increase in its input price.
The policy implications of our result are as follows. FTC or DOJ recognize that consumers may
benefit from competitor collaborations in various ways. However, the welfare eect of competitor
collaborations such as joint production is still controversial. Creane and Konishi (2009), for example,
show that the joint production, which includes technology transfer, also has a positive eect on social
welfare while the market price rises up. In general, cooperative agreements that tend to raise prices
or to reduce output are challenged by the agencies as per se illegal, while agreements not challenged
as per se illegal are analyzed as the rule of reason to determine their overall competitive eects.
Therefore, based on Creane and Konishi’s (2009) result, we can not conclude joint productions should
be promoted. In contrast to their research, the joint production in our model certainly raises not only
consumer surplus but also social welfare. Our result may justify some approvals for joint production
agreements by antitrust agencies.
The overall point that we want to emphasize is that making an analysis of MPFs suggests a number
of possibly important and certainly interesting economic consequences. We believe that this paper
provides a new insight into competition among MPFs.
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Appendix A: The equilibrium when upstream market with monopolist
A.1 The equilibrium when monopolist employing uniform pricing
The first-order conditions is
dM
dw = w
 4
3(1 + ) +
X
i2f1;2g
X
k2fA;Bg
qik = 0: (30)
The equilibrium input price is obtained as
wMU =
1
8(4v   z1B   z2B): (31)
The equilibrium quantity and price are obtained as
qMUik =
4(1   )v   (15 + )zik + (9   )z jk + (1 + 15)zil   (9   1)z jl
24(1   2) (32)
and
pMUk =
1
12
(8v + 3z1k + 3z2k   z1l   z2l): (33)
This leads to the equilibrium profits:
MUDi =
(4v + ziB + z jB)2   2(4v + ziB + z jB)(4v   15ziB + 9z jB) + (4v   15ziB + 9z jB)2
9  82(1   2) ; (34)
MUM =
(4v   z1B   z2B)2
48(1 + ) : (35)
The conditions that the interior solutions indeed exist, qMUik > 0, are
 <
4v   15zik + 9z jk + zil + z jl
4v   15zil + 9z jl + zik + z jk  ¯
MU
ik : (36)
We also have to derive the condition the upstream firm has no incentive for changing its equilibrium
input price, and the condition is  < ¯MUd (see Appendix B). Hence, the condition for the equilibrium
is  < minf¯MUik ; ¯MUd g.
A.2 The equilibrium when monopolist employing discriminatory pricing
The first-order conditions are
@M
@wi
= wi
 4
3(1 + ) + Qi(wi;w j) + w j
2
3(1 + ) = 0: (37)
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The equilibrium input prices are
wMDi =
1
4
(2v   ziB): (38)
The equilibrium quantities and prices are
qMDik =
2(1   )v   2(3 + )zik + (3 + )z jk + 2(1 + 3)zil   (1 + 3)z jl
12(1   2) (39)
and
pMDk =
1
12
(8v + 3z1k + 3z2k   z1l   z2l): (40)
This leads to the equilibrium profits:
MDDi =
(2v + 2ziB   z jB)2   2(2v + 2ziB   z jB)(2v   6ziB + 3z jB) + (2v   6ziB + 3z jB)2
9  42(1   2) ; (41)
and
MDM =
(2v   z1B)2 + (2v   z2B)2 + (z2B   z1B)2
24(1 + ) : (42)
The conditions that the interior solutions indeed exist, qMDik > 0, are
 <
2v   6zik + 3z jk + 2zil   z jl
2v   6zil + 3z jl + 2zik   z jk  ¯
MD
ik : (43)
We also have to derive the condition that the upstream firm has no incentive for deviation to the other
price (see Appendix B). Hence, the condition for the equilibrium is  < minf¯MDik ; ¯MDd g.
Appendix B: Conditions that upstream firms do not deviate
So far, we assume that the upstream firms determine their input prices such that the downstream
firm can produce both of the final goods. Since the downstream firms are MPFs, their input demand
functions are kinked. The upstream firms under the kinked input demand may find the deviation
beyond the kinked point profitable. In this section, we derive the conditions that such deviations are
unprofitable for them.
In the case of exclusive suppliers, given the input price of U1, U2 faces the following problem,
max
w2
w2q2Ajw1=wE1 s:t q2Bjw1=wE1  0:25
25We check whether U2 deviate or not, because U2 tends to deviate than U1.
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The problem reflects the possibility that U2 may find another price profitable by giving up the input
demand from the non-core product. Define EU2d as the solution above, and therefore the no deviation
condition for the exclusive supplier is EU2 > 
E
U2d, or
 <
320v(5v + 2z1B   7z2B) + 289z21B   1348z1Bz2B + 1684z22B   120
p
2(2z2B   z1B)(10v + 2z1B   7z2B)
80v(20v   7z1B + 2z2B)   401z21B + 1772z1Bz2B   1796z22B
 ¯Ed :
(44)
Similarly, the no deviation conditions for monopolist employing uniform pricing and discriminating
pricing are, respectively,
 <
12v(v + z1B   2z2B) + (7z2B   5z1B)(z1B + z2B)   2
p
3(2z2B   z1B)(4v   z1B   z2B)
12v2   (z1B + z2B)2  ¯
MU
d (45)
and
 <
v(20v   34z2B + 14z1B) + (27z22B   21z1Bz2B + 3z21B)   2
p
69(2v   z2B)(2z2B   z1B)
v(20v + 22z2B   14z1B)   (25z22B   13z1Bz2B + z21B)
 ¯MDd :
(46)
Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
Dierentiating CD1 with respect to z2B, we have
dCD1
dz2B
< 0 ,  > v   2z1B + z2B
v
:
This violates the interior solution condition, q1B > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We first show minf¯C1A; ¯C1B; ¯C2A; ¯C2Bg = ¯C2B to identify the condition for interior solution. Define
NiB  v   2ziB + z jB. Note that N1B > N2B, and then ¯C2A > ¯C1A and > ¯C1B > ¯C2B. Comparing ¯C1A and
¯C2B, we have ¯
C
1A > ¯
C
2B. Therefore the interior solution conditions are satisfied if and only if  < ¯
C
2B
holds.
The dierence between the profits of the downstream firms is as follows.
CD1   CD2 =
(z2B   z1B)(N1B + N2B   2v)
3(1   2) :
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We can thus prove the proposition if N1B + N2B   2v > 0. Since the expression is decreasing in ,
it suces to show the above inequality at  = ¯C2B. Substituting  = ¯
C
2B, we have 3(z2B   z1B) > 0.
This shows that for any  < ¯C2B, 
C
D1 > 
C
D2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We first show minf¯E1A; ¯E1B; ¯E2A; ¯E2Bg = ¯E2B. Define MiA  20v + 16ziB   11z jB, MiB  20v   44ziB +
19z jB. Note that M2A > M1A and M1B > M2B, and then ¯E2A > ¯
E
1A and ¯
E
1B > ¯
E
2B. Comparing ¯
E
1A
and ¯E2B, we also have ¯
E
1A > ¯
E
2B. Therefore the interior solution conditions are satisfied if and only if
 < ¯E2B holds. A few lines of computations establish that ¯
E
2B > ¯
E
d . Thus it is sucient to show the
proposition for  < ¯Ed .
Dierentiating ED1 with respect to z2B, we have
dED1
dz2B
< 0 ,  > 80v   506z1B + 241z2B80v + 394z1B   209z2B  
E
1
:
Dierentiating ED2 with respect to z2B, we have
dED2
dz2B
< 0 ,  < 140v + 253z1B   548z2B
140v   197z1B + 352z2B  ¯
E
2:
We compare E
1
and ¯E2. A few lines of computations establish that
¯E2 > 
E
1
, v > z2B(16z1B   11z2B)
10(6z1B   5z2B)  vˆ
E :
After some calculations, we can show that ¯Ed is greater than ¯
E
2, and thus v > vˆ
E is the condition
for the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We first show that if the technology transfer occurs, then the consumer surplus increases. The condi-
tion that the technology transfer enhances the consumer surplus is
dCS E
dz2B
< 0 ,  < 16v   13(z1B + z2B)
16v + 5(z1B + z2B)  ¯CS :
Proposition 3 shows that the technology transfer can occur if and only if  2 (E
1
; ¯E2). Hence, we
will show ¯CS > ¯E2. Define T1  140v + 253z1B   548z2B and T2  140v   197z1B + 352z2B. We
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have
¯CS   ¯E2 =
108(110vz2B   90vz1B   17z22B   5z1Bz2B + 12z21B)
[16v + 5(z1B + z2B)]T2
=
108[90v(z2B   z1B) + 17z2B(v   z2B) + 3vz2B   5z1Bz2B + 12z21B]
[16v + 5(z1B + z2B)]T2
>
108[90v(z2B   z1B) + 17z2B(v   z2B) + 3z22B   5z1Bz2B + 12z21B]
[16v + 5(z1B + z2B)]T2
=
108[90v(z2B   z1B) + 17z2B(v   z2B) + 3(z2B   56 z1B)2 + 11912 z21B]
[16v + 5(z1B + z2B)]T2 > 0:
We next show that if the technology transfer occurs, then social welfare increases. The condition
that the technology transfer enhances social welfare is
dWE
dz2B
< 0 ,  < 280v + 407z1B   727z2B
280v   223z1B + 263z2B  ¯W :
Hence we will show ¯W > ¯E2.
¯W   ¯E2 =
(280v + 407z1B   727z2B)T2   (280v   223z1B + 263z2B)T1
(280v   223z1B + 263z2B)T2
=
540[(z2B   z1B)(70v   67z2B) + 140z2B(v   z2B) + z1B(114z2B   44z1B)]
(280v   223z1B + 263z2B)T2 > 0;
which proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Comparing the profits of the downstream firms, we have
ED2 > 
E
D1 ,  >
16v   19(z1B + z2B)
16v + 11(z1B + z2B)  
E :
Now we show that there exists  satisfying both the above condition and the interior solution condi-
tion.
¯Ed > 
E , v > (z1B + z2B)[(43   24
p
2)z2B   (11   9p2)z1B]
82z1B   (60p2   46)z2B
 vE :
This yields the condition for the proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 6:
The proof follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 1. Define EA  4v + z1B + z2B, EiB 
4v   15ziB + 9z jB. We first show minf¯MU1A ; ¯MU1B ; ¯MU2A ; ¯MU2B g = ¯MU2B . Note that E1B > E2B, and
therefore ¯MU2A > ¯
MU
1A and ¯
MU
1B > ¯
MU
2B . We then compare ¯
MU
1A and ¯
MU
2B ,
¯MU1A   ¯MU2B =
(EA   E2B)EA   (E1B   EA)E2B
EAE1B
:
Since EA > E2B and EA E2B > E1B EA, thus ¯MU1A > ¯MU2B . Therefore the interior solution conditions
are satisfied if and only if  < ¯MU2B holds. (since we can confirm ¯MU2B > ¯MUd , it is sucient to show
the proposition for  < ¯MU2B .)
Dierentiating MUD1 with respect to z2B, we have
dMUD1
dz2B
< 0 ,  > EA + 9E1B
E1B + 9EA
 MU
1
:
We now show that the above condition violates the interior solution condition.
MU
1
  ¯MU2B =
9EA(E1B   E2B) + E2A   E1BE2B
EA(E1B + 9EA) > 0;
which proves the proposition. (¯MU1A > ¯MU2B implies E2A   E1BE2B > 0)
Proof of Proposition 7:
The proof follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 2. Comparing the profits of the downstream
firms, we have
MUD1   MUD2 =
(E1B   E2B)(E1B + E2B   2EA)
9  82(1   2) :
We can prove the proposition if E1B + E2B   2EA > 0. Since the expression is decreasing in , it
suces to show this at  = ¯MU2B . Substituting  = ¯
MU
2B , we have E1B   E2B > 0. This shows that for
any  < ¯MU2B , 
MU
D1 > 
MU
D2 .
Proof of Proposition 8:
The proof follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 1. Dierentiating MDD1 with respect to z2B, we
have
dMDD1
dz2B
< 0 ,  > 2v   10z1B + 5z2B
2v + 6z1B   3z2B  
MD
1
:
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Dierentiating MDD2 with respect to z2B, we have
dMDD2
dz2B
< 0 ,  < 2v + 5z1B   10z2B
2v   3z1B + 6z2B  ¯
MD
2 :
Now we show there does not exist  satisfying the above conditions. Since 2v   10z1B + 5z2B >
2v + 5z1B   10z2B and 2v   3z1B + 6z2B > 2v + 6z1B   3z2B, thus MD
1
> ¯MD2 , which proves the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 9:
The proof follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 5. Define HiA  2v + 2ziB   z jB, HiB 
2v   6ziB + 3z jB. We first show minf¯MD1A ; ¯MD1B ; ¯MD2A ; ¯MD2B g = ¯MD2B . Note that H2A > H1A and
H1B > H2B, and thus ¯MD2A > ¯
MD
1A and ¯
MD
1B > ¯
MD
2B . We then compare ¯
MD
1A and ¯
MD
2B ,
¯MD1A   ¯MD2B =
(H1A   H2B)H2A   (H1B   H2A)H2B
H2AH1B
:
Since H2A > H2B and H1A H2B > H1B H2A, ¯MD1A > ¯MD2B . Therefore the interior solution conditions
are satisfied if and only if  < ¯MD2B holds.
We next show ¯MD2B ¯MDd , which implies the no deviation condition assures the interior solution.
¯MD2B   ¯MDd =
2(z2B   z1B)(2v   z2B)[2(
p
69   3)v + (9  p69)z1B   2(12  
p
69)z2B]
H2A[v(20v + 22z2B   14z1B)   (25z22B   13z1Bz2B + z21B)]
> 0:
Comparing the profits of the downstream firms, we have
MDD2 > 
MD
D1 ,  >
4v   5z1B   5z2B
4v + 3z1B + 3z2B
 MD
Finally, we show there exists  satisfying the above condition and the no deviation condition. With
some algebra, we obtain the condition for the proposition,
¯MDd > 
MD , v > [2(17  
p
69)z2B   (5 +
p
69)z1B](z1B + z2B)
4[22z1B   (3
p
69   7)z2B]
 vMD:
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Figure 1: The structure of the model.
Top: exclusive suppliers
Bottom: monopolist employing uniform (discriminatory) pricing
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Figure 2: The relations between profits and z2B (Exclusive suppliers case).
Solid (dotted) line shows the profit of the (in)ecient firm
[ v = 1; z1B = 0:1;  = 0:64]
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Figure 3: The condition under which the technology transfer raises the downstream firms’ profits
(Exclusive suppliers case).
[ v = 1; z1B = 0:1]
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Figure 4: The relations between profits and  (Exclusive suppliers case).
[ v = 1; z1B = 0:1; z2B = 0:12]
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Figure 5: The condition under which the inecient firm earns more profit (Exclusive suppliers case).
[ v = 1; z1B = 0:1]
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Figure 6: The relations between profits and z2B (Discriminatory monopolist case).
[ v = 1; z1B = 0:1;  = 0:64]
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Figure 7: The relations between profits and  (Discriminatory monopolist case).
[ v = 1; z1B = 0:1; z2B = 0:11]
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Figure 8: The condition under which the inecient firm earns more profit (Discriminatory monopolist
case).
[ v = 1; z1B = 0:1]
???
?? ??
????????
??? ????
??? ??? ??????
???? ??? ???????????
???????
Figure 9: The structure of the extended model (Many suppliers case).
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Figure 10: The relations between profits and z2B (Many suppliers case).
[ v = 1; z1B = 0:1;  = 0:2; nC = 1; nE = 2]
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Figure 11: The relations between profits and z2B (Many suppliers case).
[ v = 100; z1B = 0:1;  = 0:2; nC = 8; nE = 30]
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